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1) Is the fifth amendment privilege against self- 
incrimination violated by a court order directing a parent to 
produce her previously abused son or reveal his whereabouts?
2) Does the assertion of a mother’s fifth amendment 
privilege against seIf-incrimination prevail in the face of 
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ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE 
COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the Court of Appeals of Maryland is reported 
at In re Maurice M. . 314 Md. 391, 550 A.2d 1135 (1988).
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This case was decided and Judgment was entered by the Court 
of Appeals of Maryland on December 19, 1968. The petition for 
writ of certiorari was timely filed and was granted on April 3, 
1989. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under section 
1257(a) of Title 28 of the United States Code.
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
This case involves the fifth amendment to the United States 
Constitution.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On January 23, 1987 the infant son of Jacqueline Bouknight,
Maurice, was admitted to the hospital with a broken leg and pre­
existing fractures. (J.A. 13.) Because of the nature of the 
injuries, the Baltimore City Department of Social Services (the 
"Department”) obtained authorization on February 11, 1987 to 
place the child under shelter care in a foster home. (J.A. 6- 
10.) In addition, the Department filed a petition in the Circuit 
Court for Baltimore City (Division of Juvenile Causes) to declare 
Maurice a Child In Need of Assistance under Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. 
Code Ann. I 3-601(e) (1984). The petition recited a history of 
the child’s injuries and detailed Ms. Bouknight’s emotional 
problems and previous abusive conduct toward Maurice. (J.A. 8- 
10.) At a May 19, 1987 hearing, Ms. Bouknight stipulated to the
facts alleged in the petition, and she agreed to continue her 
child’s care in a foster home. (J.A. 20-21.)
On July 17, 1987 Maurice was returned to Ms. Bouknight’s
care subject to the results of a psychological evaluation. (J.A. 
27.) Dr. Joseph M. Eisenberg conducted the evaluation on July 
27, 1967 and concluded that Ms. Bouknight was not "emotionally
capable of providing the adult protection, nurturance, and care 
that would be required for the child’s safety and security."
(J.A. 25.) Ms. Bouknight’s child was declared to be a Child In
2
Need of Assistance on August 18, 1967. The parties agreed that
Ms. Bouknight would retain custody of the child provided that she 
cooperate with the Department and refrain from physically 
punishing him. (J.A. 27-28.)
In early April of 1986 the Department sought the assistance 
of the Baltimore Police Department, as they were unable to locate 
Ms. Bouknight’s child. On April 15, 1986 the case was referred 
to the Homicide Division. (J.A. 88.)
On April 16, 1988 the Department acknowledged the
possibility of this being a murder case (J.A. 90) and filed a 
petition alleging that Ms. Bouknight failed to comply with the 
August 18, 1986 order. (J.A. 33-35.) Specifically, the petition
claimed that by refusing to provide the current whereabouts of 
Maurice, Ms. Bouknight had failed to cooperate with the 
Department. In addition, the Department filed a Motion for 
Contempt based upon Ms. Bouknight*s refusal to disclose the 
whereabouts of her son when asked by a Department representative 
on April 7, 1988. (J.A. 36-39.)
On April 20, 1988 the Juvenile Master held Ms. Bouknight in
contempt for failing to produce her child in court. (J.A. 55.) 
The court also invoked the participation of a Homicide detective. 
Detective James Jones (J.A. 52), who advised the Department that 
Ms. Bouknight's case should be regarded as a homicide case.
(J.A. 93.) During the next week, both the Homicide and Youth 
authorities continued to work with the Department on Ms. 
Bouknight's case (J.A. 94), again characterizing her case as a
3
possible homicide. (J.A. 95.) Ms. Bouknight was arrested on 
April 27, 1966. At her hearing, she provided inaccurate
information as to her son’s whereabouts. (J.A. 65, 70.)
Detective Jones was present during these proceedings. (J.A. 67.)
On April 26, 1988 the court continued to hold Ms. Bouknight
in civil contempt for failing to produce Maurice before the court 
or to reveal his exact whereabouts. (J.A. 74.) Accordingly, Ms. 
Bouknight was forced to remain in jail. Her counsel argued that 
the opportunity to purge herself of contempt was not 
constitutionally valid if it would involve the admission of a 
crime. (J.A. 72.) Nevertheless, the court suggested that an 
appropriate criminal investigation be initiated. (J.A. 75.)
The court conducted further hearings on the constitutional 
issue of se1f*incrimination (J.A. 103-44), and the Homicide
Division continued its investigations by putting additional 
detectives on the case. (J.A. 98.) On May 26, 1968 the Juvenile 
Court refused to vacate its order on the grounds that Ms. 
Bouknight could purge herself in ways that did not involve her 
testimony. (J.A. 157.)
The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari prior to 
a decision by the Court of Special Appeals and vacated the 
Juvenile Court’s contempt order on December 19, 1966. It held 
that (1) requiring Ms. Bouknight to produce her child or provide 
information regarding his whereabouts violated her fifth 
amendment privilege against se1f-incrimination; (2) Ms. Bouknight 
did not waive her constitutional privilege by providing
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inaccurate Information as to the child's whereabouts; and (3) the
public right to protect children did not outweigh Ms. Bouknight’s 
individual right against se 1 f - i ncr im i na t i on. In re Maurice Mj_. 
550 A.2d. at 1135. The Department is seeking reversal of the 
Maryland Court of Appeals’ decision.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Juvenile Court's contempt order, requiring Respondent 
Bouknight to produce her infant son or to reveal his exact 
whereabouts, violates Respondent's fifth amendment privilege 
against se1f-incrimination. Furthermore, no societal interest is 
sufficient to overcome Ms. Bouknight’s core constitutional 
pr1Vilege.
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution 
protects an individual from being ’’compelled in any criminal case 
to be a witness against himself ....*' U.S. Const, amend. V. 
The spirit of this constitutional privilege requires that the 
sovereign seeking to prosecute an individual must do so on the 
strength of evidence gathered through its own independent labors, 
rather than through the coerced assistance of the accused.
An effective judicial analysis of a fifth amendment claim 
involves three crucial questions: the court must determine 
whether the elements of "compulsion," "testimony" and 
"incrimination" have been sufficiently established. See Doe v._ 
United States. 487 U.S. 108 S. Ct. 2341 (1988) (Doe II); see
also Fisher v. United States. 425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976).
5
If the court finds that a suspect has been compelled to make an 
incriminating testimonial communication, the conclusion is 
inescapable that the suspect's fifth amendment privilege against 
se1f-incrimination has been violated.
A civil contempt order constitutes sufficient compulsion for 
the purposes of the fifth amendment claim. Doe 11. 108 S. Ct. at
2346. In the present case, by requiring Ms. Bouknight to produce 
the infant before the court or reveal his whereabouts in order to 
purge herself of contempt, the prosecution has compelled her to 
produce evidence.
To be considered "testimonial," a suspect's communication 
"must Itself, explicitly or Implicitly, relate a factual 
assertion or disclose information." Doe 1 1. 108 S. Ct, at 2347, 
Ms. Bouknight’s compliance with the court order would implicitly 
assert the facts of (1) her continuing control and dominion over 
the infant and (2) the actual location of the infant. In 
addition, compelling an individual to "disclose the contents of 
Cher] own mind," through words or actions, constitutes testimony 
for the purpose of the fifth amendment. Curcio v. United State_s, 
354 U.S. 118, 128 (1957). Because the dominion and control of
the child and his actual location are facts peculiarly within Ms, 
Bouknight's knowledge, their compelled disclosure must be 
entitled to fifth amendment protection. The facts and 
circumstances of the present case clearly indicate that Ms. 
Bouknight's act of producing the demanded evidence constitutes a 
testimonial communication.
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An Individual's testimonial communications will be
considered to have an incriminating effect in situations where 
the witness has "reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a 
direct answer." Hoffman v. United States. 341 U.S. 479, 486 
(1951). The circumstances of the present case suggest that Ms. 
Bouknight has a reasonable apprehension that she will be 
prosecuted if production of the infant before the court or 
disclosure of his whereabouts reveals that a crime has been 
committed upon his person. Because Ms. Bouknight is the focus of 
the court’s suspicion, an implicit assertion of the facts of 
dominion, control and location would "furnish a link in the chain 
of evidence needed to prosecute" Ms. Bouknight for child abuse or 
possibly homicide. 1 d.
Based on the application of this Court’s recognized 
analytical framework, it is evident that compliance with the 
court order would subject Ms. Bouknight to incriminating 
testimonial compulsion in violation of her fifth amendment 
privilege against se1f-incrimination. Ms. Bouknight’s 
fundamental constitutional right is not overcome by a 
governmental interest in protecting the welfare of her child.
The balancing of a constitutional right in order to 
accommodate a state interest has never been invoked by this Court 
in a contempt of court situation. To the contrary, this Court 
considered the balancing of an individual’s fifth amendment 
privilege to be impermissible in New Jersey v. Portash. 440 U.S. 
450, 459 (1979).
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A balancing approach is inappropriate in the present case 
for a number of reasons. First, the doctrine of immunity 
represents a reasonable alternative means to accommodate the 
Department’s need for information. In addition, the balancing 
approach employed in the context of other constitutional 
provisions does not justify the same treatment of the fifth 
amendment. Furthermore, the only area in which this Court has 
chosen to balance a core fifth amendment privilege is in the area 
of regulatory self-reporting statutes. The civil contempt order 
under which Ms. Bouknight is being held differs significantly 
from a mere statutory reporting requirement.
Even if this Court insists upon classifying this case as one 
in which a balancing approach is appropriate, it is evident that 
Ms. Bouknight’s individual privilege is not overcome by any 
governmental interest. This Court set forth the balancing test 
for fifth amendment claims in Albertson v. Subversive Activities 
Control Board, 302 U.S. 70 C1965). Albertson held that the fifth 
amendment privilege is paramount to any government interest when 
the individual is confronted with substantial hazards of self­
incrimination. The risk of se1f-incrimination is substantial 
when the disclosure requirement is directed toward a "group 
inherently suspect of criminal activities" and when the area is 
"permeated with criminal statutes." 1d. at 79.
In applying the Albertson balancing test to Ms. Bouknight’s 
case, it is evident that she faces a substantial risk of self- 
incrimination sufficient to defeat the state’s interest. First,
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the Juvenile Court is directing the contempt order against Ms. 
Bouknight as a member of the "highly suspect group" of parents 
who may be child abusers. The second Albertson requirement also 
is fulfilled because the crimes of child abuse and homicide are 
both areas "permeated with criminal statutes."
In the self-reporting cases, this Court has refused to let 
the substantial governmental concerns such as communist 
activities, gambling, gun control and drug distribution outweigh 
an individual's fifth amendment privilege. On the other hand, 
matters such as self-reporting of traffic accidents do not 
present a substantial risk of se1f-incrimination so as to violate 
the fifth amendment. Certainly, the self-reporting of evidence 
which could lead to murder or child abuse charges would fall 
within the category in which this Court has sustained the 
individual’s privilege against se 1 f-incrimination. Therefore,
Ms. Bouknight’s fifth amendment privilege is not overcome by any 
governmental interest.
Child abuse is a serious societal problem today. But so is 
murder, rape, drug distribution and organized crime. However, no 
public interest has been held to outweigh the fifth amendment 
protection of persons accused of those crimes. Allowing an 
exception for the protection of children would initiate the 
erosion of all fifth amendment protections since all victims of 
heinous crimes would demand the same exception. This Court 
cannot allow the identity of the victim to diminish the 
defendant's constitutional rights. ' If this Court were to allow
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the exception sought by Petitioner, the "subtle encroachment" 
concerns expressed by this Court would be realized; the fifth 
amendment privilege against se1f-incrimination would then be 
subject to substantial deterioration.
ARGUMENT
I, MS. BOUKNIGHT’S COMPELLED COMPLIANCE WITH THE COURT ORDER TO 
PRODUCE HER CHILD OR REVEAL HIS WHEREABOUTS VIOLATES HER 
FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-I NCR IMI NAT I ON BECAUSE 
IT WOULD INVOLVE AN INCRIMINATING TESTIMONIAL COMMUNICATION.
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution
protects an individual from being "compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself • . . U.S. Const, amend. V.
This privilege against se1f-incrimination is not limited to
criminal cases, but can be asserted "in any proceeding, civil or
criminal, administrative or judicial, investigatory or
adjudicatory." Kastiear v. United States. 406 U.S. 441, 444
(1972) .
The Se1f- 1ncrimination Clause was intended to prevent the 
use of legal compulsion to extract from a suspect evidence 
necessary to accuse or convict her. This Court has described the 
process of compelling a person to convict herself of a crime as 
being "contrary to the principals of free government" and 
"abhorrent to the instincts of an American." Boyd v. United 
States. 116 U.S. 616, 632 (1885). Courts and scholars agree that 
the spirit of the fifth amendment privilege against self­
incrimination requires the prosecution to "shoulder the entire 
load." Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott. 382 U.S. 406, 415
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(1966); see a 1 so 8 J. Wlgmore, Evidence 317 (McNaughten rev.
1961). The sovereign seeking to prosecute an individual is 
required to do so on the strength of evidence gathered through 
its own independent labors, rather than the coerced assistance of 
the accused. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S, 436, 460 (1966); see 
genera 1 1 y E. Griswold, The Fifth Amendment Today (1955).
An effective judicial analysis of a fifth amendment claim 
involves three basic questions. First, the Court must determine 
whether the suspect has been compelled to produce evidence. 
Second, the Court must discern whether the act of producing the 
evidence is a testimonial communication. Finally, the Court must 
consider the incriminating effect of the suspect’s production of 
evidence. See Doe 1 1 , 108 S. Ct. at 2346; see also Fisher, 425
U.S. at 410. If the Court concludes that Ms. Bouknight has been 
compelled to make an incriminating testimonial communication, the 
conclusion is inescapable that her fifth amendment privilege 
against se1f^incrimination has been violated.
A. Ms. Bouknight’s compelled production of evidence
constitutes testimonial communication because it
requires her to make implicit assertions of facts and
to disclose the contents of her mind.
In analyzing the fifth amendment privilege against self­
incrimination, the Court must first determine whether Ms. 
Bouknight is being compelled to produce evidence. This Court has 
stated that "the Fifth Amendment protects the person asserting 
the privilege only from comoe11ed seIf-incrimination. " United 
States V. Doe. 465 U.S. 605, 610 (1.984) (Doe 1) (emphasis in
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original). A civil contempt order constitutes sufficient 
compulsion for the purpose of a fifth amendment claim. Doe 1 1, 
108 S. Ct. at 2346. Because Ms. Bouknight’s refusal to comply 
with the court order has resulted in her confinement for civil 
contempt, she is subject to sufficient compulsion.
The second inquiry that must be made in analyzing Ms. 
Bouknight’s fifth amendment claim is whether her act of producing 
evidence constitutes testimonial communication. This Court has 
recognized that the fifth amendment privilege applies to protect 
an accused from providing the state with incriminating evidence 
of a testimonia 1 or communicative nature. Fisher v. United 
States. 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976); Schmerber v. California, 384 
U.S. 757, 761 (1966).
To be considered "testimonial," a suspect’s communication 
"must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate a factual 
assertion or disclose information." Doe 1 1. 100 S. Ct. at 2347. 
The fifth amendment privilege, therefore, applies to acts that 
imply assertions of facts. In addition, compelling a person to 
"disclose the contents of Cher] own mind," through words or 
actions, constitutes testimony for the purpose of the fifth 
amendment. Curcio, 35A U.S. at 128. Furthermore, the 
testimonial standard applies to both the verbal and physical 
communications of Ms. Bouknight because the fifth amendment 
privilege "reaches an accused's communications, whatever form 
they might take , , . Schmerber. 384 U.S. at 763-64.
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A determination of whether Ms. Bouknight’s compliance with 
^he court order would have testimonial significance necessarily 
(jepends on the particular facts and circumstances of the present 
^ase. Fisher. 425 U.S. at 410. To purge herself of contempt and 
^hereby free herself from imprisonment, Ms. Bouknight must either 
produce her son before the court or reveal his whereabouts. By 
psquiring her to verbally disclose the infant’s whereabouts, the 
government is compelling her to "disclose the contents of her own 
njind." The actual location of the infant is clearly knowledge 
contained within Ms. Bouknight’s own mind. Likewise, the 
duration and extent of Ms. Bouknight’s control over the infant 
are facts peculiarly within her knowledge. Even if she were to 
disclose the child’s whereabouts through nonverbal means, her 
physical acts would inevitably require her to impart information 
contained within her mind. Indeed, this type of nonverbal 
communication constitutes "testimony" because the fifth amendment 
privilege protects an Ms. Bouknight’s communications "whatever 
form they might take." Schmerber. 304 U.S. 763-64. Furthermore, 
compliance with the court order requiring the production of the 
child would implicitly assert (1) her continuing dominion and 
control over the infant and (2) the actual location of the child. 
Based on the facts and circumstances of the present case, Ms. 
Bouknight’s compelled communications would have testimonial 
significance because they would make implicit assertions of fact 
and disclose the contents of her mind.
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If an individual's communication explicitly or implicitly
asserts "possession or controlt" this Court will consider It to 
pe testimonial for the purpose of a fifth amendment claim.*
Fisher. 425 U.S. at 410. In Fisher, documents of a taxpayer in 
the hands of his attorney were subpoenaed pursuant to an Internal 
lievenue Service tax investigation. In analyzing the taxpayer's 
fifth amendment claim, this Court held that "[t]he act of 
producing [documents! has communicative aspects of its own, 
wholly aside from the contents of the papers produced." Id. at 
410. In defining the "communicative aspects" of production, this 
Court stated that compliance with the subpoena would tacitly 
concede the taxpayer's possession or control of the documents.
I d. The Court further reasoned that because this averment added 
little or nothing to the prosecution's case, the "communicative 
aspects" of production were "foregone conclusions" under the 
circumstances; therefore, the act of production was not entitled 
to fifth amendment protection. Id. at 411. However, the Court's 
analysis in Fisher clearly indicates that a communication will be 
considered testimonial if it requires an individual to explicitly 
or implicitly assert facts such as location, possession and 
contro1.
The facts the government seeks to elicit from Ms. Bouknight 
cannot be considered "foregone conclusions" as they were in
* If an individual’s communications assert either 
"existence" or "authentication" they will also be considered 
testimonial. Fisher. 425 U.S. at 410.
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Fisher. On the contrary, the government presently has no
information regarding the facts of dominion, control and location 
of the child. Ms. Bouknight contends that the infant has been 
residing with her sister in Texas. (J.A. 65-66.) Although the 
government has refuted this contention, the prosecution remains 
uncertain as to the whereabouts of the infant. In addition, the 
government has not been able to provide any evidence of its own 
to establish the element of dominion and control. Unlike in 
Fisher. where the facts of dominion, control and location added 
little or nothing to the prosecution’s case, these facts would 
constitute the very foundation of the prosecution’s investigation 
of Ms. Bouknight. Indeed, since the facts of dominion, control 
and location are essential to any criminal prosecution of Ms. 
Bouknight, the lack of current criminal charges against her 
indicates that these facts are not "foregone conclusions."
The decisions of other courts lend support to this Court’s 
proposition that implicit assertions of facts constitute 
testimonial communication within the scope of the fifth 
amendment. In Cnmmonwea1th v. Hushes. 300 Mass. 583, 404 N.E.2d 
1239 (1980), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held 
that a court order compelling an individual to produce a revolver 
suspected of being used in the commission of a crime violated the 
Se 1 f - I ncrimination Clause. Although the court recognized that 
the suspect could produce the weapon without uttering a sound, it 
held that ”[i]f the defendant should produce the revolver, he 
would be making implicitly a statement about its existence.
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location and control . . . Id. at 592. Likewise, in United
States V. Catnpos-Serrano. 430 F.2d 173 C7th Cir. 1970), the 
Circuit Court considered an individual's fifth amendment claim 
involving the production of an alien registration card. The 
defendant was accused of knowing possession of a forged alien 
registration card. The court held that compelling the defendant 
to produce the card violated his fifth amendment privilege 
against se1f-incrimination because the act of production 
implicitly admitted the card's existence, location, and the 
defendant's control over it. The court proceeded to emphasize 
that "Cain individual should not be compelled to produce the 
crime itself." 1 d. at 176. These two cases exemplify the 
appropriate application of this Court’s proposition that the 
fifth amendment privilege "applies to acts that imply assertions 
of fact." Doe 11. 108 S. Ct. at 2347.
This Court’s determination that certain acts are not 
sufficiently testimonial for purposes of applying the fifth 
amendment must be distinguished from the facts of the present 
case. The fifth amendment privilege protects an individual’s 
communications and testimony, "but that compulsion which makes a 
suspect or accused the source of 'real or physical evidence* does 
not violate [the privilege]." Schmerber. 384 U.S. at 764. 
Therefore, a suspect may be compelled to furnish a blood 
sample;* to provide a handwriting exemplar;’ to stand in a
* Schmerber. 384 U.S. 757,
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lineup;* or wear particular clothing.* The fifth amendment 
privilege was not implicated in each of those cases because the 
suspects were not required to "disclose any knowledge [they might 
possess];" they were not required "to speak Ctheir] guilt."
United States v. Wade. 388 U.S. 218, 222 (1967).
In the present case, however, Ms. Bouknight is being 
compelled to disclose knowledge she has regarding the whereabouts 
of her son. She is not subject to compulsion which makes her the 
source of "real or physical evidence.** Because she is being 
required to "speak her guilt," the facts of the present case are 
distinguishable from Schmerber and its progeny.
The government has failed to establish these facts through 
its own independent labors. In effect, the government is seeking 
to be relieved of its ignorance by compelling the information 
from Ms. Bouknight. To require Ms. Bouknight to comply with the 
court order by producing the child or revealing his whereabouts 
would relieve the prosecution of its constitutional duty to 
"shoulder the entire load." Tehan, 382 U.S. at 415. Because Ms. 
Bouknight’s compliance with the court order would compel her to 
disclose the contents of her mind and to make implicit assertions 
of facts, her compelled communications would have sufficient 
testimonial significance for fifth amendment purposes.
Gi1 be r t V. California. 388 U. S. 263 (1967).
Uni ted States V. Wade. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
Holt V. United States. 218 U.S. 245 (1910).
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B. Ms, Bouknight*s compliance with the court order would
have an incriminating effect in that it would "furnish
a link in the chain of evidence" needed to prosecute
her.
The final factor that the Court must consider in an analysis 
of an individual's fifth amendment claim is the incriminating 
effect of the suspect's production of evidence. This Court has 
defined "incrimination" as a statement which leads directly to 
evidence implicating the accused. Wone Sun v. United States, 371 
U.S. 471. 487 (1963), The protection of the fifth amendment, 
however, extends beyond answers that would lead directly to 
implicating evidence. The privilege also embraces answers that 
would "furnish a link in the chain of evidence" needed to 
prosecute the suspected offender, Hoff man, 341 U.S. at 486, As 
the fifth amendment privilege "reaches an accused's 
communications, whatever form they might take," Schmerber, 384 
U.S, at 763-64, the Hoffman "link in the chain of evidence" 
standard applies to both verbal and physical communications.
In the present case, Ms, Bouknight's compelled testimonial 
communications and implied assertions of fact would provide the 
prosecution with a significant "link in the chain of evidence" 
needed to prosecute her. Because Ms. Bouknight is the focus of 
the court’s suspicion, if her testimonial communications reveal 
that a crime has been committed upon the child’s person, she will 
be the primary suspect in a subsequent criminal investigation.
Ms. Bouknight’s control over the child and his actual location 
are both crucial "links" in the evidence needed by the government
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to prosecute her for child abuse or possibly homicide. The 
compelled testimonial communications could possibly constitute 
disclosure of the substance or foundation of a crime. The fifth 
amendment privilege, in addition to requiring the prosecution to 
"shoulder the entire load," has always protected individuals 
against this type of testimony.
The Se1f"1ncrimination Clause applies to situations in which 
the witness has "reasonable cause to apprehend danger" from 
disclosure of compelled information. Hof fman. 341 U.S. at 486. 
The relevant inquiry, therefore, is whether the accused could 
have reasonably sensed the peril of prosecution. Id. at 468. 
Furthermore, a party who wishes to claim the fifth amendment 
privilege must be "confronted by substantial and ’real*, and not 
merely trifling or imaginary, hazards of incrimination."
Marchetti v. United States. 390 U.S. 39, 53 (1968).
Turning to the facts of the present case,' it is evident that 
Ms. Bouknight not only has a "reasonable cause to apprehend 
danger" from compliance with the court order, but that her 
apprehension is "substantial and real." The introduction of Dr. 
Eisenberg’s testimony during the Juvenile Court proceedings 
revealed his professional opinion that there was a substantial 
likelihood of child abuse in this case. (J.A. 22-26.) In 
addition, the court repeatedly expressed its concern that a crime 
had been committed upon the infant's person. Specifically, the 
court stated "there was concern that the baby was dead. Quite 
frankly, that concerns the daylights out of this court." (J.A.
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51.) Moreover, the feet that Ms. Bouknlght provided false 
information to the court indicates that she apprehended danger 
from a truthful response. The presence of a homicide detective 
throughout the proceedings serves as further evidence of the 
’’substantial and real" danger of subsequent criminal prosecution. 
Based on these facts, it is obvious that Ms. Bouknight reasonably 
sensed the peril of prosecution for child abuse or possibly 
homicide, and that her apprehension was "substantial and real." 
The conclusion that Ms. Bouknight’s compelled testimony would 
have an incriminating effect is, therefore, inescapable.
C. Ms. Bouknight’s course of conduct constitutes
insufficient evidence for this court to infer a waiver
of her fifth amendment privilege.
Petitioner attempts to argue that Ms. Bouknight’s course of 
conduct constitutes an implied waived her fifth amendment 
privilege. However, a waiver must be made voluntarily, knowingly 
and intelligently to be valid. Miranda. 364 U.S. at 444. Vague 
and uncertain evidence will not support a finding of waiver.
Smith V. United States. 337 U.S. 137, 150 (1949). In addition, 
it is impermissible to infer waiver from a silent record. Barker 
y. Wineo. 407 U.S. 514, 525-26 (1972). Furthermore, courts must 
"indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of 
fundamental constitutional rights." Emsoak v. United States. 349 
U.S. 190, 196 (1955).
Petitioner first argues that Ms. Bouknight’s course of 
conduct in assuming custody of her child and agreeing to 
"cooperate” with the Department constitutes an implied waiver of
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her fifth amendment privilege. (Petitioner's Brief at 28). 
However, the record is silent as to whether this "cooperation" 
required the compelled production of the child or disclosure of 
his whereabouts. Furthermore, the evidence of any such 
understanding of the term "cooperate" is vague and uncertain at 
best. Because of the lack of substantial evidence supporting an 
inference of waiver, Petitioner has failed to overcome this 
Court's requisite presumption against waiver.
Petitioner also argues that Ms. Bouknight has waived her 
fifth amendment privilege by providing false information 
regarding the child’s whereabouts. (Petitioner’s Brief at 29). 
Testimonial waiver can be effectuated only if Ms. Bouknight’s 
statements would have resulted in further incrimination and she 
had reason to know that those statements would be interpreted as 
a waiver. Rogers v. United States. 340 U.S. 367 (1951); Uni ted_ 
States V. Singer. 785 F.2d 228 (Sth Cir. 1986); Klein v. Harris, 
667 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1981). First, Ms. Bouknight’s statements 
did not result in further incrimination. To the contrary, Ms. 
Bouknight attempted to exculpate herself by providing false 
information regarding the child’s location. Second, because Ms. 
Bouknight presumably was unaware of the existence of her fifth 
amendment privilege,* she had no reason to know that her 
statements would constitute a waiver of that right.
* It does not appear from the record that Ms. Bouknight was 
informed by counsel or by the court of her right to remain 
si lent.
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THE FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-I NCR IMI NAT I ON IS 
NOT OVERCOME BY ANY GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST
A. Balancing of government interests against Ms,
Bouknight'B constitutional right is impermissible.
In a contempt of court situation, this Court has never
sanctioned a balancing of government interests against the fifth
amendment privilege against se1f- 1ncrimination. In fact, such
balancing was prohibited in New Jersey v. Portash., ^40 U.S. 450
(1979), which held that a person's immunized grand jury testimony
c?ould not constitutionally be used to impeach him when he was a
defendant in a later criminal trial. "[W3e deal with the
cjons t i tut iona I privilege against compulsory se 1 f - i ncr i minat ion in
its most pristine form. Balancing, therefore, is not simply:
unnecessary. It is impermissible." Id. at 459 (emphasis added).
Likewise, in Ms. Bouknight’s situation, balancing is not only
unnecessary, it is impermissible.
Balancing cannot be tolerated in this case because the
state's legitimate need for information has already been
accommodated through the doctrine of immunity. Immunity is
required if there is to be "rational accommodation between the
imperatives of the privilege and legitimate demands of government
to compel citizens to testify." Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 446
(emphasis added). Furthermore,
the accommodation between the interest of the State and
the Fifth Amendment requires that the State have means 
at its disposal to secure testimony if immunity is 
supplied and testimony is still refused. This is 
recognized by the power of the court to compel 
testimony, after a grant of immunity, bv usy of civil 
contempt and coerced imprisonment.
22
I^efkowltz V. Turley. 414 U.S. 70, 84 (1973) (amphasis added);
^ee also Lefkowitz v. Cunningham. 431 U.S. 801, 809 (1977)
(**[0)006 proper immunity is granted, the State may use its 
contempt powers to compel testimony . . . **). Because the
immunity option maintains a fair equilibrium between the 
competing government and Individual interests, there is no reason 
for the Court to further accommodate the state’s interest by now 
employing a balancing test.
It may appear that the Department does not have any means 
available to unearth the crucial information of the child’s 
whereabouts. Because the Juvenile Court can easily offer Ms. 
Bouknight immunity in exchange for the necessary information, 
this "necessity for information" argument of the Department is an 
illusion. Because it has refused to exercise this reasonable 
means of obtaining information, the Juvenile Court is powerless 
under Tur1ev and Cunningham to charge her with contempt for 
failure to testify.
The balancing of state interests against the fifth amendment 
is not justified by Petitioner’s reliance upon instances in which 
balancing has been used against other constitutional rights. 
(Petitioner’s Brief at 23-24). Unlike the first and fourteenth 
amendments, the fifth amendment exists to protect against 
society’s highest penalty of criminal prosecution. Because the 
fifth amendment protects an individual’s very liberty, it must be 
afforded the greatest protection against competing state
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interests end should not casually be subjected to a balancing 
test.'
Within the realm of the fifth amendment, there are only a 
few areas in which this Court has used a balancing test to 
encroach upon the privilege. In New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S.
649 (1984), this Court created a "public safety" exception to the 
requirement that Miranda warnings be given before a suspect’s 
answers may be admitted into evidence. Under Quar1es, an officer 
may circumvent Miranda requirements and demand information (such 
as the location of a hidden gun) from an arrested suspect if 
there is an immediate danger to the public safety and welfare.
This "public safety" reasoning is inapposite to Ms. 
Bouknight’s case. First, a literal extension of Duar1es to this 
case loads to an absurd result. Maurice’s person (the analog to 
the gun) poses no immediate danger to the public safety? only if 
the infant were endangering the immediate public safety (perhaps 
carrying a contagious disease) would this case fall within the 
stricture of Quar 1 es. In addition, Miranda requirements are a 
judicial creation. Because the fifth amendment is not a judicial 
creation, exceptions to this core constitutional protection 
cannot be devised with the same ease, if they are to be devised
’ Justices Black, Douglas and Chief Justice Warren 
emphasized the impropriety of balancing as applied to 
constitutional rights: "CNJo constitutional right is safe from 
being ’balanced* out of existence whenever a majority of this 
Court thinks that the interests of the State ’weigh more’ than 
the particular constitutional guarantee involved." Cohen v.
Hur1ev. 366 U.S. 117, 133 (1961) (Black J., dissenting).
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at all. Most importantly, the Quar1es opinion itself 
acknowledges the limits of its own holding by "recognizing a 
narrow exception to the Miranda rule in this case . . . lis.
at 656 (emphasis added). Because the Quar1es "public safety" 
exception was intended to be a narrow one, it cannot be extended 
to this case.
Only in the area of self-reporting statutes, which require 
the disclosure of potentially incriminating information, has this 
Court ever invoked a balancing test against the core fifth 
amendment privilege. Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control 
Board. 382 U.S. 70 (1965). A civil contempt order, however, is 
not a self-reporting statute. Rather, it is the judicial means 
used to compel cooperation within the trial process. This method 
of compulsion is quite distinct from a legislative enactment 
which reflects the government’s regulatory need for information.
A balancing approach would require this Court to incorrectly 
classify Ms. Bouknight’s contempt charge as a penalty for her 
failure to report information that may tend to incriminate her 
for child abuse or homicide. Because a contempt order is not a 
self-reporting statute, the Albertson balancing test does not 
even apply to this case.
B. Ms. Bouknlght’s fifth amendment privilege against self­
incrimination is not overcome when balanced afiainst the 
public need of knowing the whereabouts of the child.
Notwithstanding the foregoing arguments, if this Court finds 
this to be a situation in which balancing must occur, then Ms. 
Bouknight’s privilege is not overcome by the Department’s
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Interest In knowing the whereabouts of Maurice. This Court 
recognized that "claims of overriding [state] interests are not 
unusual in Fifth Amendment litigation and they have not fared
veil." Tur1ey. A14 U.S. at 78 (emphasis added); see also 
Cunningham. 431 U.S. at 608 ("Cw3e have already rejected the 
notion that citizens may be forced to incriminate themselves 
because it serves a governmental need").*
In A1bertson. this Court did not allow a state interest to 
prevail over the fifth amendment privilege against self- 
incrimination. In holding a statute that required individuals to 
report their association with the Communist party as violative of 
the fifth amendment, this Court set forth a balancing test to 
weigh a government interest against an individual’s fifth 
amendment claim. A1bertson, 382 U.S. at 79. Albertson held that 
a self-reporting statute violates the fifth amendment privilege 
if It presents a substantial risk of se 1 f-incrimination. J_d^
The risk of se I f - incr imlnat ion is substantial if: (D the statute 
is "directed at a highly selective group inherently suspect of 
criminal activities," and (2) it applies In an "area permeated 
with criminal statutes, where [a] response . . . might involve 
the • . . admission of a crucial element of a crime." JA:-
* Tur1ey and Cunningham held that, despite the legitimate 
state interest in maintaining integrity in government contracts, 
requiring government contractors to sign a waiver of immunity 
against subsequent criminal prosecution violated the fifth 
amendment right against se1f-incrimination.
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This court has consistently applied A1 hertson to hold self­
reporting statutes in violation of the fifth amendment when they 
present an individual with a substantial risk of self­
incrimination. For example, a statutory requirement of paying 
taxes on wagering income was struck down by this Court because 
such payments involved the disclosure of participation in illegal 
gambling activities. Grosso v. United States. 390 U.S. 62 
(1968); Marchetti v. United States. 390 U.S, 39 (1960). 
Furthermore, statutes that required the disclosure of illegally 
transporting firearms* **and illegal drug activity’* have likewise 
crumbled under the constitutional scrutiny of Albertson. In each 
case, this Court held that a substantial risk of self­
incrimination existed because the statutes were directed toward a 
"highly selective group inherently suspect of criminal activity" 
in an "area permeated with criminal statutes." Because the 
substantial risk of seIf-incrimination existed, each of those 
statutes violated the fifth amendment privilege against self­
incrimination.
In applying A1bertson to Ms. Bouknight's case, this Court 
cannot hold the fifth amendment privilege to be overcome by the 
state’s interest in knowing the whereabouts of her child.
First, the contempt order is directed toward a "group inherently 
suspect of criminal activity,". Counsel representing Maurice has
* Havnes v. United States. 390 U.S, 05 (1968).
** Leary v. United States. 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
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admitted that "virtually every CINA (Child In Need of Assistance]
case involves some allegation of abuse or neglect which is 
potentially subject to criminal indictment." In re Maurice M_. .
550 A,2d at 1142. Therefore, parents of Children In Need of 
Assistance comprise a "group inherently suspect of criminal 
activity." With specific reference to Ms. Bouknight, the record 
amply supports the fact that the Juvenile Court is selectively 
directing the contempt order toward her as an individual criminal 
suspect. The Juvenile Court itself admits to the prosecutorial 
and criminal nature of the proceedings by suggesting to the 
Department "that Cit] initiate an appropriate criminal 
investigation in this matter." (J.A. 75.) These recommendations 
to the Department, combined with the persistent involvement of 
the homicide detective and the admissions of Maurice’s counsel, 
establish that the Juvenile Court considers Ms. Bouknight to be a 
member of a "group inherently suspect of criminal activity."
The Department’s requested production of the child violates 
the second prong of A1bertson because the areas of child abuse 
and murder are "permeated with criminal statutes." Murder is an 
area that has long been "permeated with criminal statutes." In 
addition, the felony of child abuse carries a substantial 
criminal penalty of up to 15 years imprisonment in a federal 
penitentiary. Md. Ann. Code art. 27, i 35A(b) (1987). 
Essentially, the Juvenile Court is holding Ms. Bouknight in 
contempt for failure to report information that might involve the 
admission of a crucial element of a crime. A1 bertson* 342 U.S.
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at 79. If disclosure of the child reveals that a crime has been 
committed upon his person, Ms. Bouknight will have admitted to a 
crucial element of that crime.
This court upheld a self-reporting statute in only one case, 
California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971). In applying the 
A1ber tson test, this Court upheld a traffic reporting statute 
because (1) the target group of drivers was not a "group 
inherently suspect of criminal activities” and (2) the area of 
traffic accidents was not "permeated with criminal statutes.”
1 d. at 426. Because the reporting of traffic accidents did not 
involve a substantial risk of self-incrimination, the state's 
regulatory interest was allowed to outweigh the fifth amendment 
priVilege.
Ms. Bouknight is being held in contempt under Md. Cts. 8c 
Jud. Proc. Code Ann. 8 3-ei4(c) (1984). Although this statute 
appears to be as broad-reaching as the statute involved in Byers, 
the court must look to how the statute is being manipulated in 
this case. The Juvenile Court has used section 3-ei4(c) in a 
selective manner to hold Ms. Bouknight in contempt for failure to 
disclose potentially incriminating information. The nature and 
character of a contempt order should not change with respect to 
the statute that authorizes it; a civil contempt order 
constitutes compulsion under any circumstances. Doe__l_I_, 106 S. 
Ct. at 2346.
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It is important to note that Bvers decided shortlywas
before Tur1ey. Cunningham and Portash.* In Byers, this Court
allowed an encroachment upon the constitutional right within the
self-reporting context. Notwithstanding Byers, this Court in
Turley. Cunningham and Portash refused to extend this
encroachment to the interrogation or trial processes. Because
Ms. Bouknight is being forced to answer official questions in the
presence of a homicide detective, she is sufficiently within the
trial process to invoke the protection of Portash.
While Byers allowed the state regulatory interests to
override the fifth amendment, the Court nevertheless emphasized
the tremendous delicacy involved in the balancing test:
Whenever the Court is confronted with the question of a 
compelled disclosure that has an incriminating 
potential, the judicial scrutiny is invariably a close 
one. Tension between the State’s demand for 
disclosures and the protection of the right against 
self-incrimination is likely to give rise to serious 
Questions. Inevitably these must be resolved in terms 
of balancing the public need on the one hand, and the 
individual claim to constitutional protections on the 
other; neither interest can be treated lightly.
Bvers. 402 U.S. at 427 (emphasis added). Ms. Bouknight may have
to incriminate herself for the serious crimes of child abuse or
murder, crimes which are far more severe than the mere traffic
violations implicated in Byers. Because Ms. Bouknight’s
compliance with the contempt order has incriminating potential,
this Court must balance the competing interests with severe
* Byers was decided in 1971; Tur1ey in 1973; Cunningham in 
1977; and Portash in 1979.
30
Judicial scrutiny. Allowing the state interest to prevail in 
this case would be to treat her fifth amendment privilege against
se1f“incrimination too lightly.
C. This Court should not create exceptions that will
contribute to the destruction of our constitutional
privilege against se I f-incrim1nation.
”CThe] system [of criminal Justice] is undermined when a 
government deliberately seeks to avoid the burdens of independent 
investigation by compelling se1f-incriminating disclosures." 
Garner v. United States. 424 U.S. 648» 655-56 (1976). The Court 
cannot permit the government to avoid its requisite burden to 
"shoulder the entire load" simply because it claims that the 
necessary information cannot otherwise be obtained. First, the 
Department can get the necessary information through its own 
independent investigations. More conspicuously, if the Juvenile 
Court is concerned solely with the welfare of the child, it may 
offer Ms. Bouknight immunity in exchange for her testimony. Its 
refusal to do so demonstrates the prosecutorial interest of the 
court. Allowing the Juvenile Court to proceed in this manner is 
simply intolerable within the spirit of constitutional liberty 
afforded by the fifth amendment right against se I f-incrimination.
Constitutional amendments "should receive a liberal 
construction, so as to prevent stealthy encroachment upon or 
'gradual depreciation* of the rights secured by them, by
imperceptible practice of the courts . . , Gouled v. Un_i ted
States. 255 U.S. 298, 304 (1921). In Ullmann v. United States, 
350 U.S. 422, 427-28 (1956), this Court expressed its concerns
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regarding gradual encroachment upon the fifth amendment: ** 1 f it 
be thought that the [fifth amendmentj privilege is outmoded in 
the conditions of this modern agei then the thing to do is to 
take it out of the Constitution, not to whittle it down by the 
subtle encroachments of judicial opinion."
The exception sought by Petitioner constitutes this feared 
"subtle encroachment." If this Court allowed such an 
encroachment, then it would be holding that an individual s 
constitutional right must be subordinated simply because the 
potential victim is a child. The constitutional treatment of 
defendants cannot depend on who suffers from the alleged crime. 
The only logical means of differentiating between defendants is 
found in the context of legislative judgment in creating 
penalties relative to the gravity of the crime. In judicial 
proceedings, however, the state should have the same level of 
concern in prosecuting all serious crimes.
As Petitioner emphasizes, child abuse is a serious problem 
in today's society. (Petitioner’s Brief at 21). However, the 
crimes of murder and rape are equally problematic, if not more 
so. If the Court creates a "children's rights" exception, then 
the victims of these other heinous crimes will demand to know why 
they do not get the same exception, a demand which this Court 
cannot ignore. To allow an exception for children, but not for 
all victims of egregious crimes, would be to make a judicial 
value judgment. The Court would then have to justify this value
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Judgment to those defendants who would receive less 
constitutional protection as a result.
Because it is impossible for this Court to justify different 
treatment of defendants based on who the victim is, the Court 
would begin to "whittle away" at the fifth amendment with each 
new exception. The concerns of this Court, as foretold in 
Gou1ed, U1Imann. and the Cohen dissent, will become reality. The 
fifth amendment right against se1f-incrimination will gradually 
be eroded by judicial exceptions, beginning with the exception 
urged here«
CONCLUSION
The purpose and spirit of the fifth amendment privilege 
against se1f-incrimination requires the sovereign seeking to 
prosecute an individual to do so on the strength of evidence 
gathered through its own independent labors, rather than through 
the coerced assistance of the accused. Essentially, the fifth 
amendment protects an individual from being compelled to provide 
incriminating evidence through testimonial communications. It is 
the "extortion of information from the accused Cherself] that 
offends our sense of justice." Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 
322, 328 (1973).
The Juvenile Court has presented Ms. Bouknight with an 
option to purge herself of contempt, which is constitutionally 
infirmed. By requiring Ms. Bouknight to produce her child before 
the court or disclose his whereabouts, the Juvenile Court is 
attempting to extort information from her. This compelled
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production of evidence would certainly offend our sense of 
justice.
Although balancing core constitutional protections against 
state interests is a questionable endeavor, this Court must apply 
close Judicial scrutiny if a balancing approach is to be 
employed. The government arguably has two distinct interests in 
the present case: protection of the infant and prosecution of 
Ms. Bouknight. If this Court seeks to accommodate the 
governmental interest in protecting the child, the doctrine of 
immunity is available to elicit full disclosure of the 
information desired. However, the governmental interest in 
prosecuting Ms. Bouknight cannot be accommodated under any 
circumstances which would compel her to provide incriminating 
testimony. These two governmental interests must be 
distinguished from each other. Otherwise, the interests in 
protecting the child would effectively allow the government to 
prosecute Ms. Bouknight based on her coerced assistance.
The protections guaranteed by the fifth amendment reflect 
**many of our fundamental values and most noble aspirations.” 
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm*n of N.Y. Harbor. 378 U.S. 52* 55 
(1964). The Framers incorporated into our system of criminal 
justice numerous protections for individuals suspected of 
criminal activity. Although these constitutional privileges are 
sometimes "a shelter to the guilty," they often represent "a 
protection to the innocent." Id. Furthermore, these
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constitutional privilages protect an accused no matter how 
deplorable the crime alleged.
To allow the government to disregard Ms. Bouknight's core 
constitutional privilege against seIf-incrimination would be 
detrimental to the fundamental values of our criminal justice 
system. By creating a special exception to the fifth amendment, 
this Court would be effectuating a subtle encroachment upon 
individual liberties. Because it is impossible for this Court to 
justify different treatment of defendants based on who the victim 
is. the Court would begin to whittle away at the protections 
guaranteed by the fifth amendment. The Maryland Court of Appeals 
recognized that allowing the exception prayed for by Petitioners 
would begin the intolerable process of judicial erosion of the 
fifth amendment privilege against se1f-incrimination. The well- 
founded decision of that court to deny Petitioner's claim should 
not be disturbed.
Dated: November 16, 1969.
Respectfully submitted,
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